Florida Historical Quarterly
Volume 65
Number 3 Florida Historical Quarterly, Volume
65, Number 3

Article 4

1986

The Seymour Decision: An Appraisal of the Olustee Campaign
William N. Nulty

Part of the American Studies Commons, and the United States History Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida
Historical Quarterly by an authorized editor of STARS. For more information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

Recommended Citation
Nulty, William N. (1986) "The Seymour Decision: An Appraisal of the Olustee Campaign," Florida Historical
Quarterly: Vol. 65 : No. 3 , Article 4.
Available at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol65/iss3/4

Nulty: The Seymour Decision: An Appraisal of the Olustee Campaign

THE SEYMOUR DECISION: AN APPRAISAL
OF THE OLUSTEE CAMPAIGN
by

W ILLIAM H. N ULTY

UST before seven

A.M. on February 20, 1864, Colonel Guy V.
Henry’s mounted brigade, the advance guard of the Union
forces commanded by Brigadier General Truman Seymour, departed Barber’s Ford, Florida, heading west on the Lake City
and Jacksonville Road. Composed of the Fortieth Massachusetts
Mounted Infantry with the First Massachusetts Independent
Cavalry attached and Captain Samuel S. Elder’s Horse Battery
with four pieces of artillery, the mounted men soon outdistanced those marching in brigade columns. The sky was clear
and gold sunlight was just starting to filter down through the
pines.1 In a report written two days later, Seymour stated that
his objectives were to make contact with a Confederate force (he
estimated it between 4,000 and 5,000) at or near Lake City, and
then to push his mounted force on to the Suwannee River and
destroy the railroad bridge crossing that stream. 2 General
Seymour’s force included, in addition to the mounted force,
eight infantry regiments and two artillery batteries, a total of
5,115 men and sixteen pieces of artillery. By dawn the following
day, 1,355 men, a little over twenty-six per cent of the Union
force involved, would be killed or wounded, and 506 would be
missing or captured. The battle that took place that day was
proportionately the third bloodiest battle of the entire Civil War
for the Union Army and the bloodiest of any of the Federal
defeats.3

William H. Nulty is a history teacher at Orange Park High School, Orange
Park, Florida. He received his doctorate in history from the University of
Florida, Gainesville.
1. New York Herald, March 1, 1864.
2. Truman Seymour to John Wesley Turner, February 22, 1864, The War of
the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Armies, 53 vols. (Washington, 1880-1901), (hereinafter cited as OR), Ser. I,
XXXV, Pt. I, 286-87.
3. Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and Die (University, AL,
1982), 10; Thomas Leonard Livermore, Numbers and Losses in the Civil War
(Bloomington, 1957), 75, 109.
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General Seymour’s decision to advance that morning, precipitating the Battle of Olustee, was made in direct disobedience
to a plan of operations given him by his immediate superior,
General Quincy A. Gillmore, commander of the Federal Department of the South headquartered at Hilton Head, South
Carolina. It also demonstrated the complete contradiction of
Seymour’s intentions as he had conveyed them the previous
week to General Gillmore. The decision was a crucial one, it was
responsible for the failure of the Federal expedition into Florida
that had been so far highly successful. At the time of General
Seymour’s decision to advance, the Federals possessed great potential for both taking Florida out of the Confederacy and severing a subsistence supply line upon which both General Braxton Bragg’s Army of the Tennessee and General P. G. T.
Beauregard’s Confederate forces, located on the South Atlantic
coast, were dependent. While the reasoning behind Seymour’s
decision to confront the Confederates is not known, an examination of the events surrounding his changed plan may help explain it.
In Florida Seymour was in charge of a mobile maneuver
force that was part of a larger expedition led by General
Gillmore. On December 15, 1863, Gillmore had suggested a
Florida expedition to Henry Wager Halleck, commanding general of the Army. General Gillmore believed that he could recover a valuable part of the state, cut off a rich source of the
enemy’s supplies, and recruit colored troops.4
The Union forces laying seige to Charleston and Savannah
had been stalemated for some time, and the possibility of successful raids into Florida had been demonstrated in 1862 and
1863, although not on as large a scale as the expedition now
contemplated. On December 22, 1863, General Halleck granted
general approval for a military expedition into Florida as long
as Federal positions at Charleston remained secure.5
Coincidently, President Lincoln had written to Gillmore on
January 13, 1864, requesting that he give what assistance he
could to Major John Hay, Lincoln’s private secretary, who was
being sent to Florida to enroll voters loyal to the Union. No
4. Quincy A. Gillmore to Henry Wager Halleck, December 15, 1863, OR, Ser.
I, XXVIII, Pt. II, 129.
5. Halleck to Gillmore, December 22, 1863, ibid., 134.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol65/iss3/4

2

Nulty: The Seymour Decision: An Appraisal of the Olustee Campaign

300

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

mention was made in Lincoln’s letter of any proposed military
operation. Major Hay, who arrived at General Gillmore’s headquarters at Hilton Head, South Carolina, on January 20, 1864,
was en route to Florida in response to the urgent requests of
Union supporters who believed that the state could be reconstructed.6
General Gillmore responded after more than a week’s delay
to General Halleck’s request for a clarification of the objectives
for the proposed Florida expedition. In his report, Gillmore
added the political goal to the three he had listed in his December 15 request. He stated that this additional objective was
“in accordance with instructions which I have received from the
President.“7 Gillmore, in order to gain Halleck’s approval for
the proposed expedition, was not being completely candid in his
statement. In a subsequent inquiry by the United States Senate
Joint Committee on the Conduct and Expenditures of the War
into the origin, progress, and results of the Florida expedition,
Gillmore’s chief of staff, Brigadier General John W. Turner,
was asked: “Did Major Hay bring down any orders or directions
of a military character, or were his instructions entirely of a civil
nature?” Turner answered: “My understanding was that Major
Hay’s instructions were entirely of a civil nature; that General
Gillmore was simply to afford him facilities for taking a register
of the names of the qualified legal voters of the State of Florida.“8
Under cover of a diversionary attack against Confederate
forces at Charleston, the Federal expedition sailed on February
6, 1864, for Florida, and made a surprise landing at Jacksonville,
the following day. The plan was to push rapidly inland to the
rail junction at Baldwin and to seize a train if one was there.9
There was a delay in crossing the bar at the mouth of the St.
Johns River, and the full Union force was not ashore until noon
on February 8. Before sundown, a portion of the invading force
left Jacksonville in three columns heading west. Camp Finegan,
a Confederate installation some ten to twelve miles distant, was
6. Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln: The War Years, 4 vols. (New York, 1939),
III, 6.
7. Gillmore to Halleck, January 31, 1864, OR, Ser. I, XXXV, Pt. I, 279.
8. U. S. Congress. Senate. Conduct of the War, 38th Cong., 1st sess., S.R. 47,
1864, 9.
9. Seymour to Gillmore, February 5, 1864, OR, Ser. I, XXXV, 280-81.
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surprised and seized although a number of its southern defenders escaped. The Union mounted force under Colonel Henry
bypassed the camp and captured four pieces of artillery belonging to the Milton Light Artillery. Baldwin was reached about
sunrise on February 9. Three railroad cars were captured, one
containing a gun belonging to the Milton Light Artillery, and a
large quantity of supplies— cotton, rice, tobacco, pistols, and
other property valued at a half million dollars.“10 The Baldwin
junction connected the rail line from Fernandina to Cedar Key
with the road running from Jacksonville to the area west of
Tallahassee. It was a key point, important to the flow of subsistence supplies for the Confederacy.
General Seymour reported the capture of Baldwin to General Gillmore but expressed disappointment over the failure to
seize a train. A locomotive was essential to resupply his troops
moving westward beyond Baldwin. Using wagons would not be
11
a very satisfactory alternative. Gillmore assured Seymour that
a locomotive would be available within a day and instructed him
to push forward towards the Suwannee River.12 Colonel Henry’s
mounted force had already left Baldwin on the morning of February 10, capturing thirteen bales of cotton about four miles
from the town. Upon approaching Barber’s Ford the Federals
found 1,000 barrels of turpentine and 500 pounds of bacon in
a building next to the railroad.13 Colonel Henry’s troops continued through Barber’s Ford, cautiously approaching the
South Fork of the St. Mary’s River where the advance guard ran
into an ambush manned by elements of the Second Florida
Cavalry. Both sides lost several men, but the much stronger
Union force continued through to Sanderson, arriving about
six in the evening. Here they found several buildings in flames,
one which reportedly held 3,000 bushels of corn and another
some 2,000 barrels of turpentine and resin.14 The Federals captured 200 bags of salt, fifty bushels of oats, and other commissary supplies.15

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

New York Tribune, February 20, 1864.

Seymour to Gillmore, February 10, 1864, OR, Ser. I, LIII, 99.
Gillmore to Seymour, ibid., XXXV, Pt. I, 473.
New York Tribune, February 20, 1864.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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The mounted Union raiding force left Sanderson about two
the following morning, moving west towards Lake City. Within
a mile and one-half from Lake City the horsemen encountered
a Confederate force deployed in a line of skirmishers in a belt
of woods. After some initial sparring by both sides, Colonel
Henry decided to pull back until such time as the infantry, now
some thirty-four miles to the rear at Sanderson, had reached
him. Henry also had to take into consideration the approaching
darkness, the condition of the horses, and an impending
rainstorm.16
Reporting to Gillmore from Baldwin on the morning of February 11, and prior to Colonel Henry’s contact with the Confederate forces at Lake City, General Seymour assessed the status
of the operation. 17 Without adequate transportation for resupply, any move towards Lake City, he felt, was impractical.
Moreover, he believed that the Confederates there had more
infantry and artillery than he currently had available. Furthermore, Seymour agreed that, “the backbone of rebeldom is not
here” in Florida; he did not believe that Florida would rejoin
the Union until there were other Federal victories. He suggested
a possible political motive for the operation, noting that it was
“in opposition to sound strategy” and would have not been permitted had General Halleck been directing the operation.18 He
recommended that the advance force be withdrawn, that only
Jacksonville and Palatka be held, and that the St. Johns River

16. Ibid.; Benjamin W. Crowinshield, A History of the First Regment of Ma
sachusetts Cavalry Volunteers (New York, 1891), 261.
17. Seymour to Gillmore, February 11, 1864, OR, Ser. I, XXXV, Pt. I, 281-82.
18. Ibid. In September 1863, L. D. Stickney, federal tax commissioner for
Florida, suggested to Salmon P. Chase, secretary of the treasury and a
potential Republican candidate for president in 1864, that a Florida military expedition was needed and that General Gillmore was favorable to the
idea. In December of the same year Stickney wrote to Chase again promoting an expedition and suggesting that Gillmore might be confirmed as a
major general for his “services” in such an operation. Since federal tax
commissioners could only function in occupied territory, Stickney, obviously, would profit from expanded federal control in Florida. Seymour
was also bringing up the fact that approval for the Florida expedition had
come from a higher source than the commander in chief of the army. See
Ovid L. Futch, “Salmon P. Chase and Civil War Politics in Florida,” Florida
Historical Quarterly 32 (January 1954), 169-70; Stickney to Chase, December
11, 1863, quoted in David Herbert Donald, ed., Inside Lincoln’s Cabinet: The
Civil War Diaries of Salmon P. Chase (New York, 1954), 190.
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be used as the base for a cavalry assault into the middle of the
state. Any movement forward, Seymour noted, would have to
be predicated upon what Colonel Henry encountered at Lake
City. He indicated that he would “regret being compelled to go
beyond the Saint Mary’s South Fork with my infantry.“19
Gillmore and Seymour conferred together at Baldwin the
night before the latter’s letter was written. Captain Gustavas
Sullivan Dana, chief signal officer on Seymour’s staff, recorded
that the two men had spent most of the night talking while “us
poor staff officers were trying to catch 40 winks on the floor.“20
According to Captain Dana, “neither general had much faith in
the success of the expedition and that it was purely a political
move, intending to drive the rebels to the west side of the
Suwannee River giving us the whole east side of the State which
was to be protected by gunboats patrolling the Suwannee and
Saint Mary’s Rivers, and thus enabling the large part of the
State to have a vote in the coming presidential election.“21 If
Dana’s observations were accurate, both Gillmore and Seymour
were taking a much more limited view of the expeditions’objectives than had been originally proposed. It would also seem that
Gillmore had not really understood, or was deliberately disregarding, the instructions given him by President Lincoln and
John Hay, and was elevating the political purpose to top priority
over the other objectives.
Apparently apprehensive about the advance of Union forces
past Sanderson, Gillmore ordered eight companies of the Fiftyfourth Massachusetts to Baldwin and directed Seymour not to
“risk a repulse in advancing on Lake City, but hold Sanderson
unless there are reasons for falling back which I don’t know.“22
Gillmore followed this message with another advising Seymour
that if his advance met serious opposition, he should concentrate
at Sanderson and at the South Fork of the Saint Mary’s.23
Seymour replied by telegraph (it had just been installed that
day) from Baldwin to Jacksonville that there was no news from

19. Seymour to Gillmore, February 11, 1864, OR, Ser. I, XXXV, Pt. I, 281-82.
20. Lester L. Swift, ed., “Captain Dana in Florida: A Narrative of the Seymour
Expedition,” Civil War History 11 (September 1965), 248.
21. Ibid.
22. Gillmore to Seymour, February 11, 1864, OR, Ser. I, XXXV, Pt. I, 282-83.
23. Ibid.
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Colonel Henry and that his command had already left for Sanderson. One regiment, the Third U. S. Colored Troops, remained at Baldwin, and another, the Eighth U. S. Colored
Troops, at Pickett’s (Ten Mile Station).24
From Sanderson, on the morning of February 12, General
Seymour informed General Gillmore that although he still had
not heard from Colonel Henry, he was ordering the advance
force back to Sanderson and was sending a regiment out to
meet them. Seymour planned to destroy public property at Sanderson, and to return with Colonel Henry’s force to the South
25
Fork of the Saint Mary’s. Gillmore warned Seymour of a possible mounted force that might be approaching from the north,
and he ordered him to concentrate his forces at Baldwin. He
also informed Seymour that the expected locomotive had not
yet arrived.26
Although neither Gillmore nor Seymour had anything concrete indicating the presence of any formidable opposition, they
appeared to be warning each other to be cautious. Seymour’s
loss of contact for a time with his advance force left him without
specific information on the enemy situation. At the same time,
General Gillmore assumed that if Seymour was ordering Colonel Henry back it was because he knew the Confederates were
too strong.27 Gillmore took additional precautions by ordering
the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts regiment which had been garrisoning St. Augustine to Palatka. Elements of the Third U. S.
Colored Troops were to scout the South Ford of the St. Mary’s
River.28
When Henry returned to Sanderson in the early afternoon
on February 12, Seymour apparently became less cautious. He
informed General Gillmore that while both Colonel Henry and
Captain Elder agreed with him on the need of only holding the
South Fork of the Saint Mary’s for the present, he was dispatching Henry on a raid to Gainesville to try to intercept the trains
that were supposed to be there. Seymour asked that the reinforcements he had requested, including another artillery bat-

24. Seymour to Gillmore, ibid., 283.
25. Ibid., February 12, 1864, 283.
26. Gillmore to Seymour, ibid., 283-84.
27. Ibid., LIII, 100.
28. Ibid.
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tery, be sent to Baldwin. He also wanted troops concentrated at
a point where they could be supplied in anticipation of being
called up to Barber’s Ford before the next advance. Seymour
ordered all ferry boats on the St. Mary’s River destroyed and
suggested that there be a naval demonstration at Savannah prior
to or during his next advance.29
General Gillmore apparently was satisfied with the progress
of the expedition, although he wondered about its future potential for greater success. In a report, February 13, to General
Halleck, he noted that the military operations necessary to
achieve the objectives of the expedition “promise to be of no
great magnitude.” General Seymour, he reported, was holding
Baldwin and the crossing at Saint Mary’s South Fork. Gillmore
planned to construct small works “capable of resisting a coup de
main” at Jacksonville, Baldwin, Palatka, and perhaps other
places, each holding some 200 to 300 men. He felt that 2,500
men, in addition to the two infantry regiments currently in garrison at Fernandina and St. Augustine, together with captured
artillery, would be sufficient for his operation. Gillmore intended to occupy the St. Johns River permanently, and he
hoped “the lumber and turpentine trade” would be revived by
“loyal” men. He informed General Halleck that he would be
leaving Florida the following day, February 14, for Hilton Head,
and that General Seymour would be temporarily in command.30
A letter from General Halleck, written on February 26, apparently before news of the defeat at Olustee had reached
Washington, accepted Gillmore’s assessment. Halleck requested
information on the number of men that could be freed for use
against some “other point of the Atlantic or Gulf coast,” mentioning Mobile and North Carolina.31
General Seymour conducted a series of small raids with his
advance force. A fifty-man unit from the Fortieth Massachusetts
moved out of Sanderson on February 13 for the raid on Gainesville. The instructions were that no private property was to be
destroyed or molested. Federal General Order Number
Twenty-four, issued a few days later, threatened dismissal to

29. Seymour to Gillmore, ibid.
30. Gillmore to Halleck, February 13, 1864, ibid., XXXV, Pt. I, 293.
31. Halleck to Gillmore, February 26, 1864, ibid., 493-94.
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any officer involved in the destruction or pillage of private property.3 2 The idea was to create good will and encourage more
Floridians to support the Union. The Gainesville raid resulted
in the capture of property estimated to be worth $l,000,000,
including cotton, turpentine, rosin, sugar, tobacco, and subsistence stores. In accordance with the new policy this property
was neither removed nor destroyed, but the subsistence stores
were distributed among the residents.33 No railroad locomotive
was captured, although some thirty-six blacks were brought to
Jacksonville. Thirty-three enlisted in the Union army.34
A second Federal raid was conducted by Colonel Guy Henry
who left Barber’s Ford on February 14 with three mounted companies from the Massachusetts Independent Battalion, the
115th New York Infantry regiment, and one gun from Elder’s
horse battery. The plan was to advance towards Callahan Station
near the Georgia border, scour the country, destroy the railroad, and burn ferry boats. 35 On February 15, Major Galusha
Pennypacker, with 300 men from the Ninety-seventh Pennsylvania and supported by gun-boats, departed Fernandina and
moved towards Woodstock Mills and Kings Ferry Mills on the
St. Mary’s River. He was to seize lumber and a mill gear both of
which were needed.36 An additional 200 men from the Ninetyseventh joined the Pennypacker raiders on February 16. Some
1,500,000 board feet of lumber was captured, one-half of which
was transported to Fernandina. 3 7 Pennypacker also brought in
two deserters, four refugees, and twenty-five blacks.38
Perhaps encouraged by their successes, General Seymour
notified General Gillmore on February 16 that he was advancing

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

37.
38.

Federal Order Number Twenty-four issued by Ed. W. Smith, February 15,
1864, Ibid., 481.
Seymour to headquarters (J. W. Turner), February 17, 1864, ibid., 296-97.
New York Herald, March 1, 1864.
James H. Clark, The Iron Hearted Regiment: Being An Account of the Battles,
Marches, and Gallant Deeds Performed by the 115th Regiment N.Y. Volunteers
(New York, 1865), 79-80.
Isaiah Price, History of the Ninety-Seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers
Infantry During the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865, With Biographical Sketches
of Its Field and Staff Officers and a Complete Record of Each Officer and Enlisted
Man (Philadelphia, 1875), 234-35.
Ibid., 238.
Galusha Pennypacker to Henry R. Guss, February 23, 1864, OR, Ser. I,
XXXV, Pt. I, 359-60.
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from Baldwin with three additional infantry regiments. He requested that elements of three other regiments be sent from
Jacksonville. 39 On February 16, Seymour, in a message sent to
General Gillmore at his Hilton Head headquarters, demonstrated his knowledge and understanding of the plan of
operations that Gillmore had described to Halleck. Referring to
a “strong movable column to push well in advance and to be
kept constantly active,” Seymour asked who was to be commander of these forces.40 Although no displeasure with Colonel
Henry had been officially recorded, General Seymour believed
that the command position should go to an officer of “approved
judgement and experience,” and he suggested Colonel M. R.
Morgan from the Subsistence Department.41 General Seymour
reversed a belief he had held earlier when he stated that the
“people of this State, kindly treated by us, will soon be ready to
return to the Union.” He needed a printing press so that he
could communicate with the local populace.42
Later that day, February 16, Seymour informed Gillmore
that he would no longer wait for a locomotive or additional
supplies and that he was planning to advance, “with the object
of destroying the railroad near the Suwannee that there will be
no danger of carrying away any portion of the track.“43 Seymour
urged that a demonstration be made at or near Savannah to
deter Confederate troops being dispatched from there. He reported on the troop dispositions he had made to support his
own movement, and noted again his critical need for both a
locomotive and a printing press. He stated in his letter that he
expected to be underway by the time Gillmore received his message. 44
Upon receiving General Seymour’s communications, General Gillmore immediately sent him a note, hand-delivered by
his chief of staff, Brigadier General J. W. Turner, suspending
the forward movement and ordering the troops back to
Baldwin. General Gillmore called attention to his plan of oper-

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Seymour to Gillmore, February 16, 1864, ibid., 482.
Ibid., LIII, 101.
Ibid.
Seymour to Turner, ibid.
Seymour to Gillmore, ibid., XXXV, Pt. I, 284-85.
Ibid.
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ations and to his last instructions to Seymour. He was to “hold
Baldwin and the Saint Mary’s South Fork, as your outposts to
the westward of Jacksonville, and to occupy Palatka, Magnolia,
on the Saint John’s.” Colonel Henry’s mounted force would be
kept in motion “as circumstances might justify or require.“45
Gillmore cited Seymour’s earlier statements about the futility of
the operation and the poor chances of restoring Florida to the
Union. Gillmore indicated that he was confused over what
Seymour was doing, and he was ordered to comply with the
instructions he had received before General Gillmore had left
Florida.46 Unfortunately, General Turner’s ship ran into bad
weather, and he did not arrive in Florida with General
Gillmore’s letter until after the Battle of Olustee had been
fought and lost.
General Seymour’s decision to advance is highly controversial and is shrouded in mystery. When General Turner was later
questioned by the Senate Committee on the Conduct of the
War, and was asked if this advance was considered a breach of
orders, he replied: “General Gillmore did not intend or expect
to have General Seymour advance.“47 Seymour had made that
decision, according to Turner, because he believed the population was ready to return to the Union. He did not anticipate
a large Confederate force in front of him, and he believed the
destruction of the Suwannee River railroad bridge would prevent enemy forces from coming into Florida.48
Colonel Joseph W. Hawley, regimental commander of the
Seventh Connecticut and acting commander of one of General
Seymour’s four brigades at the Battle of Olustee, later wrote of
a meeting “a night or two before the battle” that General
Seymour had held with “six or eight” of his officers.49 According
to Hawley, the officers felt that it would be impossible to hold
a position in the middle of the state “having for its line of communication a rickety railroad with one engine running sixty

45. Gillmore to Seymour, February 18, 1864, ibid., 285-86.
46. Ibid.
47. U. S. Congress. Senate. Conduct of the War, 38th Cong., 1st sess., S.R. 47,
1864, 9.
48. Ibid.
49. Joseph Hawley, “The Battle of Olustee or Ocean Pond,” Johnson and
Buell, eds., Battles and Leaders, 4 vols. (New York, 1888), IV, 79.
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miles back to the base at Jacksonville.“50 They believed that the
Confederates could both trap the Union forces by allowing them
to advance one more day and then interdict the railroad that
connected to Jacksonville. Most officers favored using the St.
Johns River as the main western line, but Seymour, according
to Colonel Hawley, “thought it his duty to go on.“51
Another theory as to why Seymour changed his mind so
suddenly has to do with a plan for a military action in South
Carolina that he had submitted to United States Senator Ira
Harris from New York on January 12, 1864, one month before
the Florida expedition. 52 The plan suggested an amphibious
landing on the South Carolina coast, a march inland of some
forty miles, and an attack on the key railroad junction at Branchville, South Carolina. The operation would divide the Confederacy by driving a wedge between Generals Robert E. Lee and Joe
Johnston. 53 The Branchville rail junction would be fortified, and
if the Confederates attacked they would be at a disadvantage.
General Seymour was echoing the offensive— defensive strategy
envisioned by the former railroad executive, Union General
George C. McClellan, who foresaw the importance of rail junctions as strategic targets and the advantage that rifled guns had
given to the defense. The plan had a good probability of success
at the time of the Port Royal attack in 1862, but it would have
been more difficult in 1864. General Lee and General P. G. T.
Beauregard, commander of the Confederate forces in South
Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, had reorganized the southern
coastal defenses into mobile defenses, giving special attention to
the use of railroads and their defense.
When he sent his plan to Senator Harris, General Seymour
suggested that General Gillmore would favor it. Since there was
no endorsement by Gillmore, apparently Seymour was acting
without official approval. Seymour did suggest that Harris bring
the plan to the attention of President Lincoln, but asked that
“these views might, if you please, be expressed as your own.“54

50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Seymour to Ira Harris, January 12, 1864, OR, Ser. I, LIII, 95-98.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
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It would seem that General Seymour was being motivated to
some extent by his own personal ambitions.
Assigned to the Florida expedition, General Seymour may
have become disenchanted with the prospect of being involved
with an operation that was smaller in scale and less strategically
important than the one that he was proposing for South
Carolina. In his letter to Senator Harris, he belittled a Florida
expedition, claiming that the state would fall by itself into Union
hands when General Johnston was defeated.55 He also expressed
this opinion later in substance to General Gillmore. Finding
himself in Florida with no immediate prospect for more glorious
fields of battle, General Seymour seemed to be applying the
same strategic reasoning that he had used in his Branchville
operation proposal to the situation in Florida. If the railroad
bridge over the Suwannee at Columbus could be destroyed, it
would separate east and west Florida. Seymour may also have
heard that there was a possible second bridge crossing the
Suwannee River in the vicinity of Sulphur Springs. Supposedly
it was not complete, but was on the proposed rail connector line
between Lawton, Georgia, and Live Oak, Florida. The connector line route had been graded and cross-ties laid, but it needed
rails. If rail iron became available to the Confederates, the connector line could have been in operation within six weeks.56 The
existence of even an incomplete connector line bridge, particularly one crossing the Suwannee River relatively close to the
bridge at Columbus, may also have tempted General Seymour
to risk an advance. The opportunity not only to separate east
and west Florida, but to insure the separation of Florida from
Georgia by rail made that area of the Suwannee strategically
important.
Whether Seymour was aware of the existence of the connector line is not known, but General Gillmore had mentioned to
General Halleck that one objective for the Florida expedition
would be to prevent the Confederates from moving rail to the
connector point.5 7 Seymour did believe that some rail for Florida
might be removed to Virginia and used to repair lines there.
55.
56.

Ibid.
C. McClenaghan to H. C. Guerin, October 29, 1863, ibid., XXVIII, Pt. II,
461.
57. Gillmore to Halleck, January 31, 1864, ibid., XXXV, Pt. I, 279.
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That had to be prevented. General Seymour may also have felt
that his career was languishing in comparison to his fellow officers. Although he had graduated from West Point in 1846, he
was subordinate in command to General Gillmore who had
graduated from West Point three years later. Seymour had
served with distinction as an artillery officer in the Mexican War
and against the Seminoles in Florida in 1856-1858. He was at
Fort Sumter during the bombardment in April 1861. He commanded a division at Malvern Hill in the Peninsula Campaign,
and was brevetted a lieutenant colonel for his actions at Second
Manasass. He also distinguished himself at the Battle of South
Mountain, and was brevetted a colonel for his performance at
5 8
He was transferred to Charleston harbor in
Sharpsburg.
November 1862, where, under a master plan conceived by General Gillmore, he was the field commander charged with the
abortive attack on Battery Wagner in July 1863. In that engagement, the North lost 1,515 men, the South only 181. Military
analysts have charged Seymour with being too slow to order
supporting units into the attack, a charge that would be repeated
in relation to his conduct at Olustee.59 If Union battles were
listed in terms of losses by percentages of men killed and
wounded against the number that participated, Olustee would
rank third and Battery Wagner sixth. The percentage of casualtities (wounded and killed) for Olustee was 26.5 and for Battery
Wagner, 21.4. 6 0 One analyst ranking assaults on fortified positions listed Olustee first among the bloodiest defeats for the
Union and Battery Wagner second.61 What is appalling is that
the same man, General Seymour, commanded at both battles.
Perhaps after a series of distinguishing performances early in
the war, General Seymour found himself bogged down for two
years, performing the tedious requirements of seige duty in a
military area that was a side show to more momentous events
and with only a bloody failure to show for his efforts. Anxious

58.

Ezra J. Warner, Generals In Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders (Baton
Rouge, 1959), 176-77, 432-33.
59. Peter Burchard, One Gallant Rush: Robert Gordon Shaw and His Brave Black
Regiment (Battleboro, VT, 1965), 133, 181.
60. Thomas Leonard Livermore, Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America,
1861-1865 (Bloomington, 1957), 75.
61. Ibid.; McWhiney and Jamieson, Attack and Die, 11.
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to recoup his personal career fortunes after the disaster at Battery Wagner, he blundered into an even worse one in Florida.
The decision to advance was made rather suddenly. Despite
General Seymour’s statement on February 17 that he would be
on the move by the time General Gillmore received his letter, it
would appear that the final decision to advance was made some
time during the night of February 19. George Whittemore, a
newspaper correspondent accompanying General Seymour’s
forces, noted that on Friday, the nineteenth, no one, including
General Seymour, supposed that an advance would be made for
a few days.62 This was evidenced by the activities of men and
officers in constructing shelters and other conveniences to provide additional comfort. This probably would not have been
done had an immediate move been expected.63 Whittemore reported: “Sometime during the night General Seymour received
information of the enemy’s whereabouts and plans which led
him to believe that by pushing rapidly forward his column, he
would be able to defeat the enemy’s designs and secure important immediate advantages. Whatever that information may
have been, the events of Saturday would indicate it was by no
means reliable, or that General Seymour acted upon it with too
much haste.“64
Except for the raids on Gainesville and Callahan Station,
Seymour’s forces, concentrated in the vicinity of Baldwin and
Barber’s Ford, had been relatively inactive for nine days after
the skirmish at Lake City on February 11. By contrast, the Confederate forces were moving quickly to meet the threat. When
Colonel Henry was repulsed at Lake City, General Joseph Finegan, commanding the Confederate troops facing the Federal
expedition, reported having 600 infantry and cavalry and two
guns.6 5 By February 13, Finegan reported 2,250 infantry and
cavalry and ten guns, and by the time General Seymour made
his move, he had amassed 5,200 infantry and cavalry and three
batteries containing twelve guns.66 Most of these troops were

62. New York Times, March 1, 1864.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. George Baltzell, “The Battle of Olustee,” Florida Historical Quarterly 9 (April
1931), 207.
66. Ibid.
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from the now weakened Charleston and Savannah defenses,
but General Beauregard considered the threat to his subsistence
supply line from Florida critical. 67 Beauregard also realized the
possible potential of the Federal expedition which apparently
the Union commanders had not comprehended. He warned
General Finegan to be careful of a second landing from the
Gulf of Mexico.68 A Federal invasion of the Florida Gulf coast,
combined with the one at Jacksonville, could have been very
successful. Finegan had concentrated all of his forces at Lake
City and the rest of the state was almost completely undefended.
General Beauregard was taking a calculated risk by concentrating such a large force in Florida. He was not only risking the
weakened coastal defenses before Charleston and Savannah, but
he was also placing troops in Florida that the war department
in Richmond was pressuring him to send to the relief of the
Army of the Tennessee. Beauregard made several attempts to
secure a replacement for himself so that he could go to Florida
and take charge of the Confederate defense, but he was not
successfu1.68 It was an indication, however, of how strongly he
felt the threat posed by the Federal expedition. More than
10,000 Confederate troops were eventually diverted from other
areas to Florida. The 4,000 or so that fought in the Battle of
Olustee traveled by rail through southern Georgia to a point
north of Madison, Florida, and then marched overland to the
railroad at Madison. Although this massive movement of troops
and equipment had to pass relatively close to the Union positions, nowhere is there any indication that General Seymour
was either aware of the movement or the number of troops
involved during the nine days of his inactivity. He had the
means to obtain this information with his mounted units and to
do something about it. He also had the means to feel out the
Confederate strength in front of him, but there is no indication
that he took any such precautions.
Up until the time of General Seymour’s command decision

67. Ibid.
68. P. G. T. Beauregard to Joseph Finegan, February 11, 1864, OR, Ser. I,
XXXV, Pt. I, 600.
69. Beauregard to Samuel Cooper, February 9, 1864; Beauregard to D. H.
Hill, February 9, 1864; Beauregard to Howell Cobb, February 9, 1864,
ibid., 581.
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to move forward, the Federal expedition into Florida in 1864
was an unqualified success. The landing at Jacksonville had been
a surprise, and the rapid movement inland had produced notable results in the capture of men and materials and disruption
of Confederate defenses. At the Lake City skirmish on February
11, Colonel Henry had the advantage in men and mobility. Had
he been able to push on to Lake City, and then to the Suwannee,
he could have captured a locomotive and destroyed the bridge
or bridges. Even after the Union troops pulled back, they were
successful in conducting raids. General Gillmore conceived of
creating a Federal enclave extending from Fernandina to
Baldwin to Palatka to St. Augustine and using it to control the
central part of the state. It would have significantly reduced
Florida as a base for Confederate supplies. Also it would have
provided a source of recruits for the Union’s black regiments
and helped restore Florida to the Union. General Seymour was
a combat-experienced officer, yet he made his decision to move
forward after more than a week’s inactivity in the middle of
enemy-occupied territory with little knowledge of the strength
or location of his opponent and with inadequate logistic support.
Within a few days he had completely reversed his assessment of
the expedition and disregarded the advice he had sought from
his immediate subordinates. Although informing General
Gillmore that he would be on the move on or about February
17, he did not begin until three days later and from all indications that move was the result of a quick decision.
Whatever compelling reason or reasons caused General
Seymour to override prudent military judgement and make his
fateful decision will never be known. One can only speculate on
his strange behavior the week prior to Olustee and the factors
that contributed to that decision. His defeat at Olustee ended
further Federal interest in Florida and the relatively moderate
treatment of the enemy’s civilian population as General William
T. Sherman would shortly demonstrate. Surprisingly, General
Seymour’s military career managed to survive both Battery
Wagner and Olustee. He was transferred to the Army of the
Potomac where he was captured at the Wilderness. After being
exchanged, he commanded a division in the Shenandoah Valley,
at the seige of Petersburg, and in the Appomattox campaign.
He was brevetted a major general in both the regular army and
the volunteers at the end of the war. He was promoted to the
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substantive rank of major in the Fifth Artillery in 1866, and he
served in that position until he voluntarily retired in 1876. He
then moved to Florence, Italy, where he died in 1891.70
The Federal expedition into Florida in 1864 was not a total
failure. It forced the Confederates to divert manpower badly
needed elsewhere, it disrupted for a while, and diminished
thereafter, subsistence supplies from Florida, and it demonstrated the ability of black soldiers, such as those in the
Fifty-fourth Massachusetts, to perform under fire. Union forces
continued to occupy coastal portions of Florida and conduct
raids into the interior until the end of the war in the spring of
1865.
70. Warner, Generals in Blue, 432-33.
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